We consider a problem of allocating multiple identical objects to a group of agents and collecting payments. Each agent may receive several objects and has quasi-linear preferences with a submodular valuation function. It is known that Walrasian mechanisms are manipulable. We investigate the incentive property of Walrasian mechanisms in economies with a large number of objects. Given a set of agents and a preference profile, an agent i asymptotically dominates an agent j if at sufficiently many objects, i's incremental valuation is higher than j's incremental valuation. We show that for each economy, if there is no agent asymptotically dominating the other agents, and if there are sufficiently many objects, any Walrasian mechanism is non-manipulable at the economy.
Introduction
Auctions are often conducted to efficiently allocate objects such as spectrum licenses, public houses, treasury bills, etc. The Walrasian mechanism is an auction often studied in the literature.
1 Under truthful reporting, the Walrasian mechanism selects an efficient allocation. 2 However, the Walrasian mechanism turns out to be manipulable: some agent has an incentive to misreport his preferences. Such manipulability leads Walrasian mechanisms to select an inefficient allocation (Ausubel et al., 2014; Baisa, 2015) .
In the auction theory literature, some authors focus on large economies where there are many agents and possibly many objects, and investigate whether the incentive issues and inefficiency of Walrasian mechanism are resolved. For example, Swinkels (2001) , Jackson and Kremer (2006) , and Bodoh-Creed (2013) consider (Bayesian) Nash equilibria and show that under different assumptions on preferences, equilibria of Walrasian mechanisms arbitrarily close to efficient as the number of agents and possibly that of objects go to infinity. Azevedo and Budish (2015) show that truth-telling is asymptotically optimal against any full support distribution of the other agents' preferences.
In reality, however, there are situations in which there are many objects while the number of agents is relatively small. For example, in FCC's AWS-3 auction, there are nearly 1600 objects while there are only 70 bidders. 3 To the best of our knowledge, few papers in the literature on auction theory focus on such situations.
We investigate non-manipulability of Walrasian mechanisms for the cases in which there are sufficiently many identical objects. In our paper, each agent is assumed to have quasi-linear preferences with a submodular valuation function. First we show that even if there are sufficiently many objects, a Walrasian mechanism is manipulable (Example 1).
A feature of Example 1 is that there is an agent such that at sufficiently many objects, his incremental valuation is higher than any other agents' incremental valuations. We say that a preference profile satisfies no asymptotic domination if there is no such agent. We show that if no asymptotic domination is satisfied and there are sufficiently many objects, 1 In auction theory, this auction format is sometimes called a uniform price auction. 2 The Walrasian mechanism also satisfies some other desirable properties under truthful reporting such as no-envy (Foley, 1967) and individual rationality.
3 See Auction 97 summary, FCC, available at http://wireless.fcc.gov/auctions/default. htm?job=auction_summary&id=97.
then each Walrasian mechanism is non-manipulable.
We also consider the case where both the number of agents and that of objects are sufficiently large. In particular, we study replica economies. First, we show that some Walrasian mechanism is manipulable at any replica of an economy (Example 2). The minimum price Walrasian mechanism is a Walrasian mechanism that assigns a minimum price Walrasian equilibrium allocation for each preference profile. Finally, we show that for each economy, if it is replicated sufficiently many times, each minimum price Walrasian mechanism is non-manipulable at the replica economy.
Related literature
Several papers in auction theory study large auctions. Most of them focus on some specific auction(s). For example, Swinkels (2001) , Jackson and Kremer (2006) , and BodohCreed (2013) consider Walrasian mechanisms, Swinkels (1999 Swinkels ( , 2001 ) and Jackson and Kremer (2006) consider discriminatory auctions, 4 and Cripps and Swinkels (2006) and Fudenberg et al. (2007) consider double auctions. On the other hand, Azevedo and Budish (2015) consider a general large market model including a variety of models such as auction model, matching model, etc.
The most related papers to ours are Swinkels (2001) , Jackson and Kremer (2006) , Bodoh-Creed (2013) , and Azevedo and Budish (2015) . However, there are several differences between our paper and these four papers. First, our paper and these four papers focus on different types of large economies. As we have mentioned, these four papers focus on cases in which there are sufficiently many agents. On the other hand, we focus on cases in which there are sufficiently many objects.
Second, the allocation achieved as an equilibrium and agents' incentives in large economies in our paper are different from those in the four papers. Swinkels (2001) , Jackson and Kremer (2006) , Bodoh-Creed (2013) achieve an approximately efficient allocation as a (Bayesian) Nash equilibrium, while our result is interpreted as the result that an (exactly) efficient allocation is achieved as a Nash equilibrium when the realized preference profile satisfies no asymptotic domination. Azevedo and Budish (2015) consider a notion called strategy-proofness in the large, which requires that in large economies, truth-telling should be approximately optimal against any full support distribution of the other agents' preferences. On the other hand, our result implies that in large economies, truth-telling is (exactly) optimal against any distribution of the other agents' preferences such that preference profiles consisting of his true preference relation and the other agents' preferences in the support of the distribution satisfy no asymptotic domination.
Third, these four papers make an assumption that each agent demands up to some fixed unit of objects. In our model, this assumption implies that at some point, the incremental valuation of each agent becomes zero. Thus, in our model with this assumption, if there are sufficiently many objects, then the prices given by Walrasian mechanisms are zero, and this implies that no agent can benefit from misreporting their preferences. Hence, under the assumption, our result becomes trivial. Thus, we do not make the assumption.
There are also papers focusing on large markets in a variety of models such as classical exchange economy (Roberts and Postlewaite, 1976; Sicilian, 1982, 1990; Jackson and Manelli, 1997) , matching model (Immorica and Mahdian, 2005; Kojima and Pathak, 2009; Che and Kojima, 2010; Che and Tercieux, 2015; Lee, 2015) , etc.
This article is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce the model and definitions. In Section 3, we define the Vickrey and the Walrasian mechanisms, and state several facts on the mechanisms. We state the main result in Section 4. In Section 5, we consider replica economies and state a result. All the proofs appear in Appendix.
Preliminary and Definitions
We consider economies with arbitrary finite number of agents and arbitrary finite number of identical objects. Each "potential" agent is indexed by a natural number i ∈ N. Let N be the class of finite subset of N with more than one element. Let X := N ∪ {0}. A typical (consumption) bundle of agent i ∈ N is a pair z i := (x i , t i ) ∈ X × R, where x i denotes the number of objects agent i receives and t i denotes his payment. Thus, the consumption set
Each agent i ∈ N has a complete and transitive preference relation over X × R. The strict and indifference relations associated with R i are denoted by P i and I i , respectively.
We assume that each preference relation R i satisfies the following conditions. Quasi-linearity: There is a valuation function v i : X → R + such that v i (0) = 0 and for
Integer values: For each
Let R be the class of preferences satisfying the four conditions just defined. An econ-
. Let E denote the class of economies. Given N ∈ N, R ∈ R |N| , and i ∈ N, we denote N −i := N \ {i} and
Let e := (N, R, x) ∈ E. An object allocation for e is a tuple x := (x i ) i∈N ∈ X |N| such that ∑ i∈N x i ≤ x. We denote the set of object allocations for e by A(e). A (feasible) allocation for e is a tuple z := (z i ) i∈N := ((x i , t i )) i∈N ∈ (X × R) |N| such that (x i ) i∈N ∈ A(e). We denote the set of allocations for e by Z(e). Given x := (x i ) i∈N ∈ A(e) and t := (t i ) i∈N ∈ R n , we may write (x, t) to mean the allocation ((x i , t i )) i∈N .
A mechanism is a mapping f : E → ∪ e∈E Z(e) such that for each e ∈ E, f (e) ∈ Z(e). For each e := (N, R, x) ∈ E and each i ∈ N, f i (e) denotes the bundle assigned to agent i, and we write f i (e) = (x i (e), t i (e)), where x i (e) is the number of objects that agent i receives and t i (e) is his payment. For each e := (N, R, x) ∈ E, we also write x(e) := (x i (e)) i∈N and t(e) := (t i (e)) i∈N .
We now introduce properties of mechanisms. The first property states that for each economy, a mechanism selects an efficient allocation. Given e := (N, R, x) ∈ E, an allo-
. 6 Note that this definition does not impose any condition on payment. Thus, given e ∈ E, we also say that
. Given e ∈ E, let P(e) be the set of efficient object allocations for e. Remark 1. Let e = (N, R, x) ∈ E. Suppose that there is i ∈ N such that for each x i ∈ X
Remark 2. Let e := (N, R, x) ∈ E and x ∈ P(e). Let i ∈ N, and j ∈ N \ {i} be such that
Efficiency: For each e ∈ E, f (e) is efficient for e.
Next we introduce notions of incentive compatibility. The following property states that at an economy, there is an agent who benefits from reporting false preferences.
Manipulability at e := (N, R, x) ∈ E: There are i ∈ N and e ′ := (N, (R
The following property states that at an economy, each agent does not benefit from reporting false preferences.
Non-manipulability at e := (N, R, x) ∈ E: f is not manipulable at e.
The following property requires that the mechanism be non-manipulable at each economy.
Strategy-proofness: f is non-manipulable at each e ∈ E.
6
In this section we define the Vickrey and the Walrasian mechanisms, and states facts related to the mechanisms.
x(e) ∈ arg max
and for each i ∈ N,
It is known that Vickrey mechanisms are efficient and strategy-proof.
Next, we define the Walrasian mechanism. Let p ∈ R + be a price, and let x ∈ X. The budget set at p and x is defined as
Given R i ∈ R, the demand set at p and x for R i is defined as
Condition WE-i states that each agent receives the amount of objects that he demands, and the bundle is in the budget set. Condition WE-ii states that if the price is positive, then all the objects are assigned. Given e ∈ E, let W(e) be the set of Walrasian equilibria for e, and let Z W (e) := {z ∈ Z(e) : for some p ∈ R + , (z, p) ∈ W(e)}, and
That is, Z W (e) is the set of Walrasian equilibrium allocations for e, and P W (e) is the set of Walrasian equilibrium prices for e.
In general, a Walrasian equilibrium may not exist. 7 However, if preferences are quasilinear and submodular, a Walrasian equilibrium always exists.
Fact 1 (Kelso and Crawford, 1982) . For each e ∈ E, a Walrasian equilibrium for e exists.
8
Moreover, for quasi-linear and submodular preferences, there are minimum and maximum Walrasian equilibrium prices.
Fact 2 (Gul and Stacchetti, 1999) . For each e ∈ E, there are p ∈ P W (e) and p
such that for each p
Given e ∈ E, let Z W min (e) and Z W max (e) be the sets of minimum and maximum price Walrasian equilibrium allocations for e, respectively, and let p min (e) and p max (e) denote the minimum and maximum Walrasian prices for e, respectively.
Walrasian equilibrium allocations are efficient. Furthermore, efficient object allocation are supported by any Walrasian equilibrium prices.
Fact 3 (Gul and Stacchetti, 1999) . Let e = (N, R, x) ∈ E, x ∈ A(e), and p ∈ P W (e). Then,
Definition 3. A mechanism f is a Walrasian mechanism if for each e ∈ E, f (e) ∈ Z W (e).
A mechanism f is a minimum (resp. maximum) price Walrasian mechanism if for each
By Fact 3, Walrasian mechanisms satisfy efficiency. However, they are not strategyproof.
9
7 Gul and Stacchetti (1999) show that, allowing heterogeneity of objects, if a preference relation violates the so-called "gross substitutes" condition, there is an economy where an agent has the preference relation, the other agents have gross substitutes preferences, and a Walrasian equilibrium does not exists.
8 Precisely, Kelso and Crawford (1982) consider the model where objects can be heterogeneous. They show that if preferences satisfy the gross substitutes condition, a Walrasian equilibrium exists. Our model is interpreted as a special case of their model where each agent has a submodular valuation function, and, given a payment level, each agent finds sets of objects with the same cardinality indifferent. It is known that such preferences satisfy the gross substitutes condition, and hence, Fact 1 holds. The same argument holds for Facts 2, 3, and 4.
9 See Example 1 in Section 4.
The following proposition shows the characterizations of the minimum and maximum Walrasian equilibrium prices.
10
Proposition 1 (Gul and Stacchetti, 1999) . Let e := (R, N, x) ∈ E, and x ∈ P(e). Then,
: i ∈ N and x i x}, and
Finally, the following states that if a Walrasian mechanism and a Vickrey mechanism share the same object allocation function, the payment of an agent under the Walrasian mechanism is no less than his payment under the Vickrey mechanism.
Fact 4 (Gul and Stacchetti, 1999) . Let f = (x, t) be a Walrasian mechanism and g = (x, s) a Vickrey mechanism. For each e := (N, R, x) ∈ E and each i ∈ N, t i (e) ≥ s i (e).
Main results
We study incentive properties of Walrasian mechanisms when there are many objects.
The following proposition is a sufficient condition for a Walrasian mechanism to be nonmanipulable at an economy.
Proposition 2. Let f = (x, t) be a Walrasian mechanism and g = (x, s) a Vickrey mechanism. For each e ∈ E, if f (e) = g(e), then f is non-manipulable at e.
The following example shows that some Walrasian mechanism is manipulable at economies even if there are sufficiently many objects in the economies.
Example 1. Let f = (x, t) be a minimum price Walrasian mechanism. Let N ≡ {i, j} and
Then, for each e ≡ (N, R, x) ∈ E with x ≥ 2, p min (e) = 10, x i (e) = x − 1, and x j (e) = 1.
10 Gul and Stacchetti (1999) characterize the minimum and maximum Walrasian equilibrium prices by means of surplus function for more general setting where there can be heterogeneous objects. Although Proposition 1 is derived from their result, some calculation is required. Thus, we directly prove Proposition 1 instead of deriving it from the result by Gul and Stacchetti (1999) .
, and hence f is manipulable at e.
□
A feature of this example is that agent i has higher incremental valuations at sufficiently large numbers of objects than agent j. That is, for each x i ∈ X with x i > 1, we
The following definition formalizes this feature.
Definition 4. Given N ∈ N, R ∈ R |N| , and a pair i, j ∈ N, agent i asymptotically dominates
As we have seen in Example 1, if there is an agent asymptotically dominating any other agents, there is a Walrasian mechanism that is manipulable at economies with many objects. We consider economies where there does not exist an agent asymptotically dominating any other agents.
Definition 5. Given N ∈ N and R ∈ R |N| , (N, R) satisfies no asymptotic domination if there is no agent i ∈ N who asymptotically dominates agent j at (N, R) for each j ∈ N \ {i}.
The following result states that for each Walrasian mechanism, there is a Vickrey mechanism that coincides with the Walrasian mechanism at economies where no asymptotically domination is satisfied and there are sufficiently many objects.
Theorem 1. Let f = (x, t) be a Walrasian mechanism and g = (x, s) a Vickrey mechanism.
Let N ∈ N and R ∈ R |N| . Suppose (N, R) satisfies no asymptotic domination. There iŝ x ∈ X such that for each e := (N, R, x) ∈ E with x ≥x, f (e) = g(e).
By Proposition 2, we have the following corollary.
Corollary 1. Let f = (x, t) be a Walrasian mechanism. Let N ∈ N and R ∈ R |N| .
Suppose (N, R) satisfies no asymptotic domination. There isx ∈ X such that for each e := (N, R, x) ∈ E with x ≥x, f is non-manipulable at e.
Replica economies
In the previous section, we focus only on cases where there are sufficiently many objects and there may not be many agents. In this section, we focus on cases where there are sufficiently many objects and agents. Precisely, we consider replica economies and investigate the incentive properties of Walrasian mechanisms.
Given e := (N, R, x) ∈ E and R 0 ∈ R, let N(R 0 ; e) := {i ∈ N : R i = R 0 }.
Definition 6. Given e := (N, R, x) ∈ E and K ∈ N, an economy e
Note that condition (i) implies
The following theorem states that if an economy is replicated sufficiently many times, then for each minimum price Walrasian mechanism, there is a Vickrey mechanism that coincides with the minimum price Walrasian mechanism at the replica economy.
Theorem 2. Let f := (x, t) be a minimum price Walrasian mechanism and g := (x, s) a Vickrey mechanism. Let e := (N, R, x) ∈ E and K ∈ N be such that K > max i∈N x i (e). Let
Remark 3. Gul and Stacchetti (1999) also show that in the model with possibly several different types of objects, if an economy is replicated sufficiently many times, each minimum price Walrasian mechanism coincides with a Vickrey mechanism at the replica economy. However, they assume that each agent can receive at most one object for each type. Since we do not make this assumption, the result by Gul and Stacchetti (1999) does not imply Theorem 2.
Corollary 2. Let f be a minimum price Walrasian mechanism. Let e := (N, R, x) ∈ E and K ∈ N be such that K > max i∈N x i (e). Let e ′ := (N ′ , R ′ , x ′ ) ∈ E be the K-replica economy of e. Then, f is non-manipulable at e ′ .
One may argue that Theorem 2 and Corollary 2 hold for any Walrasian mechanism.
The following example shows that there is a Walrasian mechanism such that at any replica of an economy, the Walrasian mechanism is manipulable and does not coincide with any Vickrey mechanism.
Example 2. Let f := (x, t) be a maximal price Walrasian mechanism, and g := (y, s) a Vickrey mechanism. Let e := (N, R, x) ∈ E be such that N = {i, j}, x = 2, and for each
2 otherwise,
It is also easy to see that for each
Moreover, f is manipulable at e ′ . To see this, let k ∈ N ′ be such that R
Moreover, by (ii) of Proposition 1, p max (e ′′ ) = 1.5. Thus,
□

Appendix
A Proofs of Propositions
A.1 Proof of (i) of Proposition 1
Proof. Let j ∈ N be such that x j x and v j (
Proof. We show ((
To show this, we show that for each i ∈ N, p, x) . Let i ∈ N and y i ∈ X be such that y i x i .
Case 1: y i < x i . By Claim 1 and submodularity,
Thus,
Case 2: y i > x i . By the definition of p and submodularity,
P(e), and Fact 3, we have ((x
Let i ∈ N be such that x i x and v i (
Note that such an agent always exists. Then,
This implies
A.2 Proof of (ii) of Proposition 1
Claim 3: p ∈ P W (e).
Proof. We show ((x
Case 1: y i < x i . By the definition of p and submodularity,
Case 2:
x ∈ P(e), and Fact 3, we have ((
Let i ∈ N be such that x i > 0 and
. By f i (e) = g i (e), strategy-proofness of g, and Fact 4, we have
■
B Proof of Theorem 1
First we introduce several notations. For each i ∈ N, by submodularity,
non-increasing in x, and by monotonicity, the sequence {v i (x + 1) − v i (x)} x∈N is bounded below. Therefore, the sequence {v i (x + 1) − v i (x)} x i ∈N has the limit, which is denoted by v * i . Note that by submodularity, for each i ∈ N and x i ∈ X, v i (
Moreover, by the assumption of integer values, for each i ∈ N, there is x * i ∈ X such that for each
Let N * be the set of agents who are not asymptotically dominated by any agent. De-
Step 1.
Proof. First we show the following claim.
Claim 4: Let i ∈ N and j ∈ N. Agent i asymptotically dominates agent j if and only if
Thus, On the other hand, let i ∈ N be such that v * i = v * . By the definition of v * , for each
Thus, by Claim 3, agent i is not asymptotically dominated by any other agent, which implies i ∈ N * . Hence, we conclude that
Since N is finite, there is i ∈ N such that v * Step 2. Let e := (N, R, x) ∈ E be such that x ≥x * . Then, the followings are satisfied:
This contradicts Remark 2.
(ii) By contradiction, suppose that there is i ∈ N * such that
We have two cases.
Case 1:
∑ j∈N x j (e) < x. Let y := (y j ) j∈N be such that y i = x i (e) + 1 and for each j ∈ N \ {i}, y j = x j (e).
Note that
which contradicts x(e) ∈ P(e).
. By x i (e) < x * i , we have j i, and by (i) of Step 2, j ∈ N * . By x j (e) > x * j and j ∈ N * , Let y * ∈ arg max
Proof. Suppose by contradiction that for each k ∈ N \{i, j} y * k ≤ x k (e). Then, by y j < x j (e),
implies y ∈ P(e −i ).
If y j = x j (e), then
which contradicts y * ∈ P * . Thus, y j < x j (e). By y j > y * j , however, this also contradicts
Proof. Suppose by contradiction that v j (y *
. Let y ∈ A(e −i ) be such that y j = y * j + 1, y k = y * k − 1, and for each ℓ ∈ N \ {i, j, k}, y ℓ = y * ℓ . Then,
By y * ∈ P(e −i ), we have y ∈ P(e −i ).
which contradicts y * ∈ P * . Thus, y j < x j (e). By y j > y * j , however, this also contradicts y * ∈ P * ( j). □ By y * j < x j (e), submodularity, and Claim 6,
This contradicts Remark 2. ■ Given e := (N, R, x) ∈ E and i ∈ N, let P * (e −i ) := {y ∈ P(e −i ) : for each j ∈ N −i , y j ≥ x j (e)}, and
Step 5. Let e := (N, R, x) ∈ E be such that x ≥x * , and i ∈ N. Then, P * * (e −i ) ∅.
Proof. By contradiction, suppose that P * * (e −i ) = ∅. Then, for each y ∈ P * (e −i ), there is
Let j ∈ N −i \ N * be such that y j > x j (e) for some y ∈ P * , and let P * ( j) := {y ∈ P * : y j > x j (e)}. Let
Thus, by y * ∈ P(e −i ), we have y ∈ P(e −i ).
If y * j = x j (e), then
which contradicts y * ∈ P * . Thus, y j > x j (e). By y j < y * j , however, this also contradicts 
By y ∈ P * * (e −i ), for each j ∈ N * \ {i}, y j ≥ x j (e), and for each j ∈ N −i \ N * , y j = x j (e).
Therefore,
j∈N −i y j = x, and thus,
Hence, for the case of v * > 0,
■
C Proof of Theorem 2
First, consider the case in which there is x ∈ P(e ′ ) such that
. Then, WE-ii implies p min (e ′ ) = 0, and thus, for each
Hereafter we consider the case in which for each x ∈ P(e ′ ), and (iv) for each i ∈ N and each j ∈ N i ,
A(e ′ ) be such that for each i ∈ N and each j ∈ N i , x j = x i (e).
Step 1. x ∈ P(e ′ ).
Proof. Suppose by contradiction that x P(e ′ ). Let
By x P(e ′ ) and y * ∈ P(e),
Claim 9:
Proof. By contradiction, suppose ∑ j∈N x j (e) < x. Then, by x(e) ∈ P(e) and Remark 1, for each j ∈ N, v j (x j (e) + 1) − v j (x j (e)) = 0. Since e ′ is the K-replica of e, there is j ∈ N such that R j = R ′ i and x j (e) = x i . Thus,
Therefore, monotonicity and submodularity imply v
By Claim 9 and the definition of x,
Proof. We have two cases.
Case 1: R
Thus, by y * ∈ P(e ′ ), Remark 2, R i = R j , and submodularity,
and x k (e) = x i . For the same reason, there is ℓ ∈ N such that R ℓ = R ′ j and x ℓ (e) = x j . By x(e) ∈ P(e) and Remark 2,
By y * ∈ P(e ′ ) and Remark 2, v
Thus, by y * ∈ P(e ′ ), we have y ′ ∈ P(e ′ ). Moreover, by y * i > x i and y * j < x j ,
This contradicts the definition of y
Note that |N * | ≥ K. Let i ∈ N ′ and
Step 2.
Therefore, by (2) and (3), Thus, y ∈ A(e ′ ). Moreover, for each j ∈ N ′ −i , y j ≥ x j (e ′ ).
Step 3. Let j ∈ N ′ −i be such that y j > x j (e ′ ). Let x ′ j ∈ {x j (e ′ ) + 1, . . . , y j }. Then
Proof. By (i) of Proposition 1, x ′ j > x j (e ′ ), and submodularity,
. Note that by the definition of y and y j > x j (e ′ ), we have j ∈ N * 1 ∪ N 3 . Case 1: j ∈ N * 1 . By the definition of y and j ∈ N * 1 , we have y j = x j (e ′ ) + y * j ≤ x j (e ′ ) + 1 = x j + 1. By y j > x j (e ′ ) = x j , we have y j = x j + 1 and thus, x ′ j = x j + 1. Thus, by j ∈ N * ,
Case 2: j ∈ N * 3 . By the definition of y and j ∈ N * 3 , we have x ′ j ≤ y j = x j (e ′ ) + y * j ≤ x j + 1. Thus, by j ∈ N * and submodularity,
Case 3: j ∈ N 3 \ N * 3 . By N * ∅ and j ∈ N 3 \ N * 3 , there is k ∈ N * such that k j. Then, by k ∈ N * , x ∈ P(e ′ ) and Remark 2,
By the definition of y, x ′ j ≤ y j = x j (e ′ ) + y * j ≤ x j . Thus, by submodularity,
■
Step 4. Completing the proof.
By
Step 3, for each j ∈ N ′ −i with y j > x j ,
By the definition of y,
(y j − x j (e ′ )).
Thus, we have
= t i (e ′ ).
On the other hand, by Fact 4, s i (e ′ ) ≤ t i (e). Hence, s i (e ′ ) = t i (e ′ ). ■
